Arugam Bay Information

Uncertain Future for Tissa Vitharana’s Proposals to the A.P.R.C

by D.B.S. JEYARAJ

Cabinet minister and All Party Representative Committee (APRC) chairman Prof. Tissa Vitharana participated at a forum held on June 18th at the Sri Lanka press institute. The gathering comprised journalists, media activists and publishers.

The forum was intended to encourage more discussion in all three linguistic media about Prof. Vitharane’s working paper submitted to the APRC. Vitharana was hopeful of formulating a final draft in about six weeks time.The APRC itself has met 27 times during the past eight months.

On the following day President Mahinda Rajapakse met with members of the APRC conference in Parliament. According to media reports Rajapakse has stated that ” the APRC was primarily for the benefit of India and the Western nations”.

[President Mahinda Rajapaksa meeting British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Aug 2006]

It was a stratagem to demonstrate to the International Community (IC) that a political process was on.

Rajapakse disappointed many minority community members by his frank admission of what he envisaged the APRC’s role to be.

The President also re-iterated his stance on what the final product will be. Sri Lanka was to be a unitary state. The unit of devolution was to be the district.

Rajapakse also mildly admonished Vitharana about some newspaper reports attributed to the Professor.

Rajapakse was unhappy that an impression had been conveyed through the media that the unitary state was out and that the devolution unit would be the province.

The president advised Vitharana to be careful about the media and inform him privately of dissenting viewpoints.

It had transpired during the discussions at the press institute forum that there was a difference between the Tissa Vitharana paper and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) position.

There was congruence between the chief opposition United National Party (UNP) stance and that of the Vitharana proposals.

But the SLFP stance was sharply divergent on the essentials from that of Vitharana. Now Rajapakse was confirming that the SLFP position on unitary and district as unit were non - negotiable.

During the discussions at the Press Institute forum Prof. Vitharana stated that there should be a consensus between the SLFP and the UNP to successfully implement whatever agreed upon at the APRC. It also required support of the majority of other political parties. Now it was being made clear by Rajapakse that such a consensus could only be on the basis of an inflexible SLFP stance.

Despite the worthwhile efforts of Prof. Vitharana to steer the APRC through troubled waters there is a school of thought which doubts his bona fides on the issue. This school opines that the APRC was a mere sham initiated by Rajapakse to con the world and buy time till his security forces established categorical supremacy over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

The APRC was doomed from the start as agreement among diversely extreme points of view could not be reached. To go along with the APRC exercise therefore was either a conspiracy or sheer naivete on Vitharana’s part this school of thought, felt.

[Prof. Tissa Vitharana]

This writer agrees partly with the notion that Rajapakse had ulterior motives in convening the APRC. I am also doubtful about a positive result from the APRC. But I do not agree with the charge that Vitharana is a catspaw of Rajapakse. I feel that the veteran Samasamaajist has been fihting a lonely battle to evolve something concrete out of the APRC.

While Rajapakse may have had his own reasons for appointing Vitharana, the APRC chairman has been striving hard to achieve solid results. If Vitharana fails the consequences will be tragic indeed!

This writer is not naively optimistic about the APRC . It is not that one has suspended disbelief about reality . It is more a case of trying to support the best of the limited choices available.

If the APRC fails we would have lost another chance to reach an acceptable political solution. In the absence of such a solution the rationale for the on going war gets strenghened and “legitimised” further. Therefore this column will continue as far as possible to support exercises like the APRC .

It is in this context that this writer has lent consistent support to the APRC and has endorsed the majority expert report and also the Vitharana working paper. The APRC and experts panel have not been ideal fora where like - minded people converged to formulate just and reasonable solutions.

They have in a sense been battle- grounds reflecting the divisions in the Sri Lankan polity. They have also been fora where political games reminiscent of Byzantine intrigues are being played.

In spite of this climate several persons have risen above race and religion to try and arrive at solutions beneficial to the Country at large rather than parochial interests.

Vitharana’s working paper itself was necessitated due to the divisions among members of the experts panel appointed by President Rajapakse. The expert panel was expected to assist the APRC in devising a basis for discussion. But the expert panel itself got divided.

Eleven members comprising Six Sinhala, Four Tamil and One Muslim submitted a proposal described as the majority report. Four Sinhala experts presented another report called the minority report. Two other Sinhala members came up with a dissenting report each.

The expert panel majority report was the most progressive of all reports in form and content. Besides it had multi - ethnic support whereas the other reports were by members of the majority community alone.

But Rajapakse supported by the ethno - fascists and national socialists adopted a hostile attitude towards it.There was a concerted campaign against it although the IC as well as many political parties like the UNP supported it.

With four expert reports circulating and the President being opposed to the best of them all the APRC was in a state of turmoil. Further progress seemed impossible.

It was at this juncture that Vitharana surmounted the challenge by coiming out with his own working paper as a basis for discussions. The Vitharana proposals were essentially based on the majority export report.

It was not identical and dropped a few of the more controversial elements but retained the substance of the majority expert report.The APRC was on track again.

Once again, this was not to Rajapakse’s liking but the President went along with the motions of the APRC. But Medamulana Mahinda did two things that undermined prospects of APRC success.

Firstly he welcomed into Government folds eighteen MP”s from the UNP. In one stroke Mahinda rendered the SLFP - UNP agreement worthless. Without a SLFP - UNP bi - partisan consensus the APRC was under a cloud because agreement between the two major parties was a pre- requisite for any solid achievement.

The second thing was Mahinda’s imposition of his opinion on the SLFP recommendations to the APRC. The SLFP committee headed by Prof. Wiswa Warnapala had persons like Sarath Amunugama and Dilan Perera as members. It was expected that the SLFP report would be commendable and an improvement on the 2000 draft bill.

The final report was a great disappointment to say the least. Unitary was emphasised and the unit was to be district/ village. The hand of Rajapakse in this dilution was transparent.

Against this backdrop it appeared that the APRC would not yield any worthwhile result as President Rajapakse had clearly foreclosed any chance of a viable, equitable and acceptable option emerging.

Still Tissa Vitharana persisted in trying to make the APRC work. Vitharana was working on the twin premises that the SLFP proposals were not the government proposals and that they were not final.

On this basis there was room to hope that meaningful efforts could make Mahinda Rajapakse revise his stance. One way was for constituent parties in the Government to exert pressure. The second was for members of the APRC and other political groups outside to mount pressure.

Other avenues were for civil society and media to help form public opinion. There was also the International Community. Discreet yet intensive pressure was expected from these sections.

The APRC and experts panel etc may very well have proceeded at a slow, leisured pace but for International pressure. Initially Rajapakse hoped to drag the APRC on for an unusual period of time. During this space he was optimistic of the armed forces routing the LTTE and acquiring much real estate in the North - East.

Once a military victory was achieved on ground then the APRC became irrelevant. It was for the Rajapakse regime to impose a forced peace and enforced political solution.Whether a total military victory is possible is one question. Whether a military victory sans a just political solution will resolve the problem is another question.

But the IC was not deceived. India in particular was pressurising Rajapakse intensely. This led him to declare specific deadlines. In recent times some Western nations also have shifted focus to the APRC. They feel that the APRC is the only visible silver lining today in a gloomy political sky.

The IC is not telling Colombo to call off the war against the LTTE. It is only saying dont violate democratic freedoms and human rights while fighting. More importantly the IC opines that a military solution alone is not feasible and that only a political settlement will be durable.

Therefore the IC wants an effective political solution to be achieved. The IC does not say that military efforts should be abandoned and that only a political search should be undertaken. What it requires is a credible, peace process to be on parallel to the military campaign.

Unlike the earlier stage where the IC felt a peace process could be effective only between the GOSL and LTTE , the stance this time is, that the process should be as much inclusive as possible and that a solution acceptable to a majority of opinion should be evolved.

Majority does not mean Sinhala alone but there is no denying that no solution within a united Sri Lanka will work unless a majority of the numerical majority support it.

It is in this context that the IC is supporting the APRC and evinces keen interest in its progress. The APRC has many flaws and a success is not guaranteed but it remains the best option available.

The ideal of course would have been for the GOSL and LTTE to sincerely explore the federal option in terms of the Oslo declaration. But both parties have been very insincere in that.

Under those circumstances the only alternative now is the APRC. In democracy one has to choose from what is available and not what is desirable.

However much the IC may back the APRC , its ultimate success depends on Sri Lankans themselves. Whatever the external input it is Sri Lanka’s problem alone and in the final analysis Sri Lankans have to resolve it. This is the IC position too.

So despite fits and starts, ups and downs, the APRC was seen as positive forward movement. The working paper submitted by Tissa Vitharana as basis for discussions was seen as credible. The expectation was that further discussions could enhance it further.

But now Mahinda has upset the” dodang karathe”. By stating openly to APRC members what the solution ought to be. He has also said the APRC is only to impress the IC that Colombo is keen on a political settlement.

Rajapakse has undermined the credibility of both the APRC and Prof. Vitharana. Some parties particularly those from minority commuities may feel the exercise is pointless hereafter. Future sittings of the APRC could become akin to a lame duck session of parliament.

But this column in the words of Dylan Thomas does not believe in “going out gently into that good night” but in “raging against the falling of thelight”. The towel should not be thrown in prematurely.

The APRC should not be allowed to fade away. Instead efforts should be made to strengthen it further and seek ways of utilising it to greater advantage.

The plus point of the APRC at this stage is the Tissa Vitharana proposals. These have been criticised severely by both the Sinhala and Tamil hardliners. Rajapakse is clearly dissatisfied with them. This shows that these proposals have their merits.

It is this column’s view that no solution within a united Sri Lanka will succeed under a rigidly unitary structure. The substance of devolution should amount to federalism or quasi - federalism.

However if one is realistic then one has to accept that in a climate where federalism is a “F- word” to many people on both sides of the ethnic divide, a straight course to the federal idea is difficult. Moreover Rajapakse through his myopic “chinthana” has tied himself down to a unitary state.

Under these circumstances adopting a pragmatic approach is necessary. The Tissa Vitharana proposals are the best of what is available. The best ones in recent times were the GL - Neelan package and the majority expert report.

But these are not in the picture now unless the Tamil United Liberation Front’s Veerasingham Anandasangaree resurrects the GL - Neelan package and brings it on to public domain again instead of chirping incessantly about an Indian federal model.May of the suggestions made in the majority expert report have been adopted/adapted by Vitharana.

So the Vitharana proposals remain the best bet of what is available before the Country. More importantly it enjoys the distinction of being the “official” position of the APRC to date. It has many commendable features but has shortfalls too.

But it can be improved upon if there is a will. Even Rajapakse can be persuaded into changing track if a united front is presented. For this some measures need to be taken.

[Ranil Wickremasinghe, UNP leader at a rally in Gampola on May 19th, 2007 - Pic:UNP.lk]

The onus is primarily on Ranil Wickremasinghe and the UNP. Wickremasinghe spends most of his time pointing out the negative aspects of Rajapakse’s policies and complaining to the IC about it. What is required of him is a more , determined effort. One place for Wickremasinghe to prove his fighting abilities can be the APRC itself.

The UNP should take the lead in pursuing an acceptable and equitable solution through the APRC. Instead of letting it fail the UNP should utilise it to greater advantage. Wickremasinghe himself can make a political statement - metaphorically and literally - if he himself attends the APRC once as a demonstration of his concern.

The various political parties representing the minority communities could join forces on a principled basis. Given the conduct of these parties hanging on to Mahinda’s “Sataka” I have my doubts whether they will ever rise to the occasion but nothing can be finalised without trying.

One sincerely hopes that the minority parties could present a strong position contrary to that of the SLFP and Rajapakse at the APRC.The Lanka Sama Samaaja Party (LSSP) and the Communist party (CP) could also play a part in formulating a non - SLFP viewpoint at the APRC.

There is also the fact that the SLFP is not unanimous in its position on the APRC. Though Rajapakse is trying to take the SLFP to a pre - 1956 position many stalwarts feel that the party should not go below its avowed position in 2000 when the draft bill was presented.

SWRD Bandaranaike used to say that “rivers do not flow backwards” but Mahinda and his fellow travellers from the ethno- fascist camp want the SLFP to flow backwards in terms of the party’s commitment to devolution. So there is space for hidden persuasion within the SLFP too.

There is also room for more positive public opinion being formed through progressive sections of the media. Civil society can play its part too. The International community too could take the initiative in exerting pressure on Rajapakse.

[Peace hoarding, sponsored by a Sri Lanka media organization at the dawn of last year - Pic: HumanityAshore.org]

It seems obvious that the President is trying to use the APRC as a cosmetic exercise to hoodwink the IC and buy time. But this sword can cut both ways. If a determined effort supported by the IC is made then Rajapakse could be presented with a “fait accompli” at the APRC.

If the President chooses to disregard the “consensus” of opinion at the APRC he will stand exposed. Therefore he would do his best to avert such a possibility and subvert the APRC. The need of the hour is to resist such moves.

For that efforts should be made firstly to prevent the APRC from sinking into oblivion and secondly to utilise it fruitfully and evolve a reasonable set of proposals devolving maximum powers to a large unit of devolution. Tissa Vitharana’s proposals can be the foundation for this.

Let us remember that the search for greater devolution amounting to federalism / quasi - federalism is not for or against the LTTE. It is for the silent majority of Tamil people who want to live with equal rights in a united but not necessarily a unitary Sri Lanka. At the same time it must be emphasised that devolution would help greatly in bridging the urban - rural divide and also help equalise uneven development among regions. For all this the quest to share power must not remain an unfinished task.

DBS Jeyaraj can be contacted on: djeyaraj@federalidea.com

34 comments June 29th, 2007